European Journal of Economic and Social Systems 15 N°1 (2001) 39-55
Convergence and oscillation in standardization gamesEmmanuelle Auriol1 and Michel Benaim2
1 ARQADE and IDEI, University of Toulouse I, Ad: IDEI, place Anatole-France, 31042 Toulouse Cedex, France. E-mail: email@example.com
2 Department of Mathematics, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 2 av. A. Chauvin, 95302 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex.
Auriol and Benaim (2000) studied in a model inspired by evolutionary game theory, how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies when there are two standards. They showed that the decentralized adoption process always converges toward a stable equilibrium (possibly an incompatibility one). This paper explores the robustness of Auriol and Benaim (2000) convergence results. It shows that with more than two standards the decentralized adoption process does not necessarily converge. It can oscillate and describe cycles.
Key words: Network externalities, market structure, dynamics.
© EDP Sciences 2001