Free Access
| Issue |
E.J.E.S.S.
Volume 15, Number 1, 2001
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|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 39 - 55 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ejess:2001107 | |
DOI: 10.1051/ejess:2001107
European Journal of Economic and Social Systems 15 N°1 (2001) 39-55
1 ARQADE and IDEI, University of Toulouse I, Ad: IDEI, place Anatole-France, 31042 Toulouse Cedex, France. E-mail: eauriol@cict.fr
2 Department of Mathematics, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 2 av. A. Chauvin, 95302 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex.
Key words: Network externalities, market structure, dynamics.
© EDP Sciences 2001
European Journal of Economic and Social Systems 15 N°1 (2001) 39-55
Convergence and oscillation in standardization games
Emmanuelle Auriol1 and Michel Benaim21 ARQADE and IDEI, University of Toulouse I, Ad: IDEI, place Anatole-France, 31042 Toulouse Cedex, France. E-mail: eauriol@cict.fr
2 Department of Mathematics, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 2 av. A. Chauvin, 95302 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex.
Abstract
Auriol and Benaim (2000) studied in a model inspired by evolutionary game theory, how standards and norms
emerge in decentralized economies when there are two standards. They showed that the decentralized
adoption process always converges toward a stable equilibrium (possibly an incompatibility one). This
paper explores the robustness of Auriol and Benaim (2000) convergence results. It shows that with more
than two standards the decentralized adoption process does not necessarily converge. It can oscillate and
describe cycles.
Key words: Network externalities, market structure, dynamics.
© EDP Sciences 2001